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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
promulgated thereunder should be deemed a misdemeanor. Willful
refusal to serve when conscripted should be made a felony.
(8) The governor should be allowed to assume all 'of the duties
and powers of all of the agencies under this Act only when an at-
tack occurs or is imminent.'11
These specific proposals suggest themselves upon the face of the
Act. They are not exclusive. Legislation of this nature, which gives
the power to override all other laws save the Federal Constitution,
statutes and regulations and the State Constitution deserves much
more consideration than has been given to it. The problems which
this bill attempts to solve are the most pressing questions ever pre-
sented in the state's history. There is need for a standing legislative
committee to conduct extensive hearings on the situation to: secure
the advice of recognized technological experts; study the action taken
.by other states and by Great Britain during the last war; invite rem-
edial proposals from military and police officials, firemen, labor
leaders, production heads, bar associations and other strata of our
society who could presumably aid it in formulating improvements in
the present Act. In this manner a deeper understanding of the abso-
lute requisites to an effective defense mobilization could be obtained.
As these requirements become properly defined, the legislature should
use them as a basis for imposing limitations on the current broad
powers of the defense agencies, which would allow them to carry out
their duties effectively, but would at the same time provide the best
protection possible for acknowledged civil liberties." 2
PURCHASER AT MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE - THE TITLE HE
ACQUIRES-EFFECT OF NEW SECTIONS 500-A, 506-A AND 506-B
OF THE NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW
Introduction
A new amendment to the New York Real Property Law,' which
has become effective September 1 of this year, has affected the mort-
gage foreclosure law of this state to a limited but noteworthy extent.
"I See Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861), and surrounding
history as an illustration of the terrifying results possible from the residence
of so much power in a single official, in that case: President Lincoln.
112 During the last war, England's civil defense regulations were promul-
gated by the King in Council. However, it was mandatory to place all such
regulations before Parliament, which body could void them within forty days.
2 & 3 GEo. V1, c. 31, § 88 (1939).
1 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 500-a, 506-a, 506-b. Added by Laws of N. Y.
1951, c. 610.
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The new sections provide expedient means whereby purchasers at
foreclosure sales may test the validity of interests threatening their
title and clear certain defects which heretofore were not easily
remedied. To what extent it is the policy of our law to encourage
prospective purchasers to participate at foreclosure auctions, and to
what extent these new statutory provisions square with such policy,
are questions sought to be answered herein. A brief review of the
history of foreclosure sale legislation and the purpose for which it
was enacted will aid in establishing the legislative viewpoint.
Legislative Background
As far back as 1760, a colonial statute of New York provided
for foreclosure of mortgages with judicial sale of the property. Sale,
however, would only be used if the court saw fit.2 Prior to that
time, the mortgagee's remedy took the following form. Upon the
default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee had an immediate right of
entry. Equity then provided the mortgagor a right to redeem within
a certain period. At the expiration of this time, the mortgagor's
rights could be severed by strict foreclosure. 3 During the period of
grace, the property was inalienable because of the mortgagor's out-
standing equity.4 Since the foreclosure action in those days was
purely equitable,5 personal service of the mortgagor was required but
was frequently difficult to obtain. Consequently, the 1760 statute,
according to its preamble, was enacted because the rents of lands en-
tered by mortgagees were in many cases not ". . . sufficient to answer
the interest of monies for which the same are mortgaged . . ."; and
because ".... persons who have mortgaged their estates in this Colony
frequently withdraw themselves beyond the seas.., by means whereof
no process out of the Courts of Equity can be served. . . ." 6 Thus,
it may be seen that the motive for enacting this early statute was
sympathy for the mortgagee.
Since those days, however, social policy has inclined to give
greater aid to the mortgagor.7 Often told is the sad tale of the wicked
banker who holds the mortgage on the poor widow's farm.8 The old
system of strict foreclosure was severely criticized because frequently
it permitted a mortgagee to satisfy the debt by taking property valued
far in excess of the amount of his lien.9 In nearly all jurisdictions
24 COLONIAL LAws OF NEW YORK 495 (Lyon, 1894).
3 See WAI.SH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES §§ 3, 65 (1934).
4 See Skilton, Proposed Uniform Mortgage Legislation, 9 Am. L. SCHOOL
Rav. 1128, 1129 (May 1941).5 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9.
6 4 CooLNIAL LAWs OF NEW YORK 495 (Lyon, 1894).
7 Skilton, supra note 4, at 1128.
8 See Sutherland, Foreclosure and Sale, So-me Suggested Changes in the
New York Procedure, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 216 (1937).
9 Ibid.; Skilton, supra note 4, at 1129.
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today the old forms of procedure have been displaced by judicial
sale.' 0 New York, by a statute in 1880, made sale compulsory in all
ordinary foreclosure proceedings." Possibly the legislature was then
motivated by a desire to aid the mortgagee as in 1760. This seems
unlikely, though, since by this time New York had abandoned the
title theory of mortgages,' 2 thus rendering obsolete the mortgagee's
need for personal service.13
Another reason advanced for requiring foreclosure by sale was
that it was regarded as the best method for determining the rights
of all parties interested.' 4 If this be true, it is measurably rebutted
by the existence of the very problems which induced the enactment
of the subject legislation.
It seems apparent that the main purpose of judicial sale in mort-
gage foreclosure actions today is the attempt to realize the maximum
price for the mortgagor on the sale of his premises. 5 Commensurate
with this purpose is the encouragement of competitive bidding at the
sale.' 6 However, it is discouraging to note that today few sales are
attended by competitive bidders.17 To state that the legislative pur-
pose favors unlimited encouragement of bidding is fallacious. Cer-
tainly at present there is little inducement indicated by the statutory
requirements of advertisement by notice of sale.18 By requiring the
foreclosing mortgagee to purchase large amounts of advertising space
in the real estate sections of daily newspapers, a greater number of
purchasers might readily be obtained, but any measures which would
increase foreclosure costs meet with severe criticism,19 since, in the
long run, the mortgagor must bear the burden of foreclosure costs.
Although it is argued that mortgage defalcation should be discour-
aged and that prospects of a substantial surplus money recovery might
tend to encourage defalcation, it is submitted that statutory policy
in this state generally favors the attempted recovery of a reasonable
surplus for the mortgagor, proportional to his equity in the defaulted
property.
10 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 278.
11 Laws of N. Y. 1880, c. 178, § 1626.
12 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 21.
'1 Under the lien theory today, foreclosure action is in the nature of an
action in rem. 8 CARMODY's NEW YORK PRACTICE 646 (2d ed. 1933).
14 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 922 (1951).
15Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure, 88 U. oF PA. L.
RFv. 957 (1940) passim; Sutherland, supra note 10, passim.
16 In conducting a foreclosure sale under New York statutes, the auction-
eering officer must endeavor to obtain a maximum price. 8 CARMODY, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 80.
17 Sutherland, supra note 8, at 217.
18 The statutory requirements are contained in N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §§ 712,
713. See also 8 CARMODY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 74.
19 Sutherland, supra note 8, passim.
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The Prospective Purchaser
The layman bidder at a foreclosure sale, be he the mortgagee
himself or another, is interested in purchasing nothing short of "the
lots" or "the house." If he has had experience as a purchaser he
realizes that along with the house or lots, he frequently buys trouble.20
In determining the amount of his bid, he therefore will consider the
possible expenses he may incur should the property bring such trouble.
The technical name for trouble is defective title. An intelligent pur-
chaser must anticipate the possibilities of title defects and weigh them
against available remedies.
At the foreclosure sale, a successful bidder has the privilege of
leaving a deposit in lieu of immediate purchase. He then may take
a reasonable time within which to search title.2 ' A smart bidder will
search very carefully, and if possible, obtain title insurance since the
title which is granted by the referee's deed is without warranties.22
The purchaser may reject his bid on grounds of unmarketability.
Rejection has been allowed for numerous types of defects, an ade-
quate consideration of which would fill many pages. 23  Generally
stated, the successful bidder may reject his bid in any instance where
the title may probably involve a lawsuit to determine its validity.24
At this point it may be argued that the prospective purchaser
is not deterred by the possibility of obtaining a bad title since, as has
been seen above, he may reject it when defects appear upon search.
In practice, however, a purchaser will frequently accept a doubtful
title- even purchase it without searching title - in the following
instances:
(1) Since the court must review and approve objections to title,25
involving expense and delay, a purchaser will often accept
a defective title and take his chances of clearing the defect.
This attitude is further promoted by the fact that the court
will not relieve for minor defects.2 6
(2) The usual foreclosure sale is attended by but two people,
the referee and the attorney for the mortgagee.2 7 The at-
20 "It is practically a foregone conclusion in some jurisdictions that tech-
nical flaws will be found in titles acquired through judicial sales." Note, 35
GEo. L. J. 376 (1947).
21 See WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoREcLosuRE 910 et seq. (4th ed. 1927). Sec-
tions 711 to 755 and 769 to 818 in this text contain a thorough study of the
rights of a purchaser at foreclosure sale. See also WALsH, op. cit. supra note
3, §§ 75, 76.
22 See note 36 infra.
23 WuLTsIE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 913 et seq.; WALSH, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 305 et seq.; 8 CARmoDY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 119; see Note,
59 C. J. S. 1421 (1949).
24 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 308.
25 8 CARMODY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 97.
26 Ibid.; WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 308.
27 Sutherland, supra note 8, at 217.
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torney will bid in the property at the minimum amount which
he thinks will be approved by the court.2 8  Our prospective
competitive bidder may appear at these sales and outbid the
attorney, though aware of possible title defects, if his
chances of clearing the defects appear good. While the price
remains at a bargain level, neither the mortgagee nor his
competitor care about minor expenses in clearing title.
(3) If the mortgagee, bidding the amount of his lien or less,
becomes the successful bidder, he will accept title immedi-
ately without search, since if the title be defective he stands
to lose nothing.29
(4) A title which has once been rejected for a legitimate defect
may, upon proper readvertisement, be resold . 0 A purchaser
at such resale, aware of the defect, will likewise be encour-
aged by brighter prospects of clearing title.
It is thus seen that a purchaser who will reject his bid is the
exception rather than the rule. From the above examples, it is ap-
parent that very often a purchaser will gamble on clearing title. It
is submitted, therefore, that bidders at foreclosure sales will very
frequently be influenced by the prospects of clearing title defects.
Hence, they should be quite interested in the new remedies afforded
by the subject statutes. In order to determine how much weight
should be given the new remedies, it will first be necessary to outline
the possible defects which may arise.
The Title Acquired
An exhaustive consideration of the possible problems facing a
purchaser who has accepted a referee's deed in foreclosure would fill
a good sized volume.8 ' It will be attempted here merely to present
a general classification of the interests which may be hostile to the
purchaser's title.
28 "The court, by reason of its control over its own judgments . . . has
a wide discretion on an application to set aside a foreclosure sale and to order
a resale." 8 CARIMODY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 875. Unless the purchase price
is so low as to shock the conscience of the court, the sale will not be set aside.
Masiazek v. Roberts, 211 App. Div. 417, 207 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't
1925). Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1083. Where the market value of the
property foreclosed is greater than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagee
will often bid the amount of his lien. This is so since Section 1083 prevents
a mortgagee from obtaining a deficiency judgment where the market value of
the property sold at the sale exceeds the total of liens against the property.
For a consideration of this effect, see Vaughan, supra note 15, passimn.29 Assuming that the mortgagee's sole recourse is upon the property, he
can not better his situation by rejecting his bid.
30 8 CARMODY, op. cit. spra note 13, at 931; 59 C. J. S. § 739 (1949).
31 See note 21 supra.
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A bid at the sale is an offer, which, if accepted by the auctioneer,
becomes a contract 3 2 to purchase that which is offered in the terms
of sale. 38 A purchaser, therefore, agrees to take title subject to any
encumbrances mentioned therein. Section 986 of the New York
Civil Practice Act requires that the terms of sale mention any out-
standing rights of dower, charges or liens against the property. The
terms of sale must also conform to the judgment of foreclosure.3 4
The referee sells only those interests joined in the action, 3  and
neither he nor the court makes any warranties of title.3,
Thus, when a purchaser accepts the referee's deed he accepts a
bundle of legal rights which may or may not amount to absolute title.
The rights included in the sale, assuming that the foreclosure action
was valid in all respects, are the following:
(a) The rights of the mortgagor in the property as of the date
of the original mortgage.37
(b) The rights of the mortgagee in the property, likewise, as
of the date of the original mortgage . 3
(c) Any other rights foreclosed in the action which may
include: 39
(1) rights junior to the mortgage.40
(2) certain rights senior to the mortgage, such as:
(A) rights of disputed priority, settled in the action.41
(B) senior liens joined in the action and satisfied
thereby.42
32 WALSH, op. cit. szpra note 3, at 305.
3 8 CARmovy, op. cit. sutpra note 13, at 928.
34 Luker v. Fitzer, 107 Misc. 308, 177 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1919);
see Ehrich v. Ehrich, 122 Misc. 216, 217, 202 N. Y. Supp. 357, 358 (Sup. Ct.
1923).
35 . Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1085.
36 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 314.
37 N. Y. Civ. P Ac. AcT § 1085; WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 313;
59 C. J. S. § 759 (1949).
38 Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320 (1862); Winslow v. Clark, 47 N. Y.
261 (1872) ; WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 315.
39 See WILwSIF, op. cit. supra note 21, §§ 401-407.
40 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1085; Rector v. Mach, 93 N. Y. 488 (1883);
Dorf v. Bornstein, 277 N. Y. 236, 14 N. E. 2d 51 (1938).
41Whipple v. Edelstein, 148 Misc. 681, 266 N. Y. Supp. 127 (Sup. Ct.
1933).
42 Jacobie v. Mickel, 144 N. Y. 237, 39 N. E. 66 (1894). Prior encum-
brancer, if served and made a party to the action, must appear. He may either
decline to have his rights adjudicated, or may allow the settlement but if he
does not appear, he defaults as was done in this case. See Clark v. Fuller,
136 Misc. 151, 239 N. Y. Supp. 269 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
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The purchaser's title may be void or voidable as to the following
classes of interests:
(a) Rights junior to the mortgage toward which the foreclosure
action was defective.4 3
(b) Rights senior to the mortgage [excluding those joined and
foreclosed or satisfied in the action].44
Since the purchaser has notice of the foreclosure judgment in
the terms of sale,46 he cannot be heard to complain against the fore-
closing plaintiffs that they failed to join a necessary defendant.46
Against unjoined interests junior to the mortgage, therefore, the pur-
chaser must apply the remedies he acquired by subrogation to the
rights of the mortgagee.47
As to outstanding rights senior to the mortgage, the purchaser
has no remedy.48  With the possible exception of fee interests, these
rights were required to have been mentioned in the terms of sale.
Outstanding senior fee interests are a matter of record and it has been
held that a bona fide purchaser at foreclosure sale takes precedence
over unrecorded fee interests.
49
Remedies 50
As has been stated, the purchaser at foreclosure sale succeeds
to the rights and remedies of the foreclosing mortgagee. He thereby
acquires the remedy of reforeclosure which he may exercise against
any interest neglected by the original mortgagee.8 ' Section 1082 of
the New York Civil Practice Act permits the purchaser, when apply-
ing the above remedy to a junior mortgagee and other junior lienors,
to obtain from the court foreclosure without resale (strict foreclosure)
upon the encumbrancer's failure to redeem within a certain period.
This remedy, however, is not available against an owner of a fee
45 Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916).
4a WALsH, op. cit. spra note 3, at 285.
45 See note 34 supra.
46 A purchaser buys subject to the terms of sale. See note 33 supra.
47 See note 38 supra.48 WAIsH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 314.49 Ibid.
50 Much of the material in this section is taken from the Recommendations
of the Law Revision Commission. See 1951 LE. Doc. No. 65(K), 1951
RRORT, N. Y. LAW REVISiON COmmIssIoN.
51 See note 38 supra. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
disapproved of the subject statutes before they were enacted. It was felt that
another proposed bill would better remedy the situation by tolling the operation
of Section 47-a and thus preventing any statute of limitation bar to a pur-
chaser's action to reforeclose. No consideration was made, however, of the
effect of the proposed bill (now the subject statutes) other than in regard to
the situation created by Section 47-a. N. Y. BAR ASS'N LEAis. BULL. 59 (Feb.
19, 1951).
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interest in the property.5 2 Reforeclosure with a resale would be
necessary.
By the enactment of Section 47-a of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act in 1938, an action on a mortgage must be commenced within
six years from its accrual.53 In the case of McDonald v. Daly, a
foreclosure sale purchaser, attempting to reforeclose under Section
1082 eleven years after the first foreclosure and twelve years after
the cause had accrued, was held to be barred by Section 47-a.54 The
anomalous situation resulting was as follows. A purchaser, buying
property at foreclosure sale would go into possession, make improve-
ments and settle down. Several years later, should a person toward
whom the original foreclosure action was defective challenge the
title of the peaceful purchaser, the latter might find that his remedy
of reforeclosure was barred by Section 47-a. He would, therefore,
be defenseless against such claim and might be subject to ejection.
This situation was noted in a recommendation for legislation in
the New York University Law Quarterly Review in 1948.25 The
ordinary defect in a purchaser's title was either a mere technicality
of foreclosure procedure or such an insignificant adverse interest that
the adverse party would seldom press the claim. The result was that
the purchaser's title remained unmarketable until such adverse claim
became barred by the fifteen-year ejectment statute of limitation. 6
The harshness of this situation was realized by the Law Revision
Commission and remedied by the subject legislation. 7
The remedies provided by the new sections of the New York
Real Property Law,58 while correcting the above situation, are far
more inclusive. It should be noted that the remedy provided therein
is available ". . . to determine the right of any person to set aside
such judgment, sale or conveyance (in lieu of foreclosure) or to en-
force an equity of redemption or to recover possession of the prop-
erty, or the right of any junior mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage." '9
It is available to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale, to a mortgagee who
takes a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or to the designee of such mort-
gagee. The remedy is available even though an action to foreclose
52 See Moulton v. Cornish, 138 N. Y. 133, 33 N. E. 842 (1893).
53 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 47-a, "An action upon . .. a mortgage of real
property, or any interest therein, must be commenced within six years after
the cause of action has accrued."
54 190 Misc. 136, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1947).55 Comment, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 501.
56 N. Y., Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 34, 46.
57 See note 50 supra.
58 The new Section 500-a states that it applies to purchasers at foreclosure
sale under foreclosure pursuant to both Article 65 of the New York Civil
Practice Act, and Article 17 of the New York Real Property Law. Article 17
provides for foreclosure procedure where the mortgage contains a power of
sale. Its procedure is rigid, technical, and little used. See Sutherland, supra
note 8, at 216.
59 N. Y. RaAL PROP. LAW § 500-a.
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the original mortgage would be barred by the statute of limitation.60
In the situation noted above, caused by the six-year limitation
in Section 47-a, the purchaser's right to reforeclosure was barred.
Reforeclosure, however, was only available to the purchaser against
parties toward whom the original foreclosure might be defective, to
wit, interests junior to the mortgage and other interests permitted
to be joined therein. Note, however, that the new remedy is avail-
able to determine the right of any person to recover possession of
the property or to exercise an equity of redemption. This wording
would seem to include interests senior to the mortgage as well as
junior interests. In its recommendations, the Law Revision Com-
mission points out that reforeclosure is inadequate despite any ques-
tion of the statute of limitations since it ". . . will not decide whether
the original proceedings were defective so as to render the title of
the purchaser void or voidable." 61
The remedy itself is an action brought under Article 15 of the
New York Real Property Law, entitled "Action To Compel The De-
termination Of A Claim To Real Property." It was added in 1920
upon recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to enlarge
and supplement preexisting equitable remedies for quieting title.62
With it a person in possession may bring an action to compel an
adverse claimant to try his claim as if such claimant were himself
suing in an ejectment action.6 3 'The new amendments make that
remedy available to purchasers at foreclosure sale and a mortgagee
or his designee taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure, Section 47 -a
notwithstanding.
The new Section 506-a requires the court to direct an accounting,
"as justice requires," in an action brought under Section 500-a. Such
accounting shall cover items such as rents, profits, or the value of the
use and occupation of the land, and would represent an adjustment
between the parties according to the determination by the court of
the rights of each.
The new Section 506-b provides the forms of judgment in an
action under Section 500-a. The judgment of the court may:
1. Foreclose or reforeclose pursuant to Article 65 of the New
York Civil Practice Act.
2. Grant strict foreclosure after a fixed time for redemption has
elapsed.
60 Ibid. "Such action may be maintained even though an action against the
defendant to foreclose the mortgage under which the judgment, sale or con-
veyance was made, or to extinguish a right of redemption, would be barred
by the statutes of limitation."
61 See note 50 mtpra.
62 See Note, 49 (Pt. 2) McKINNEY's CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YoRx
ANNOTATED 478.
63 1943 LEG. Doc. No. 65(G), 1943 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVISION Com-
MISSION.
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If foreclosure or reforeclosure is ordered with sale pursuant to Article
65, the court may include in the amount of the judgment the value of
any improvements made subsequent to the original foreclosure or
conveyance in lieu thereof. If strict foreclosure is ordered the court
must add to the redemption amount the value of any such improve-
ments. The amendment also contains appropriate saving clauses
which limit the effective dates of the sections in order not to infringe
upon pre-existing rights.
What now is the resultant situation? In so far as his subroga-
tion to the rights of the foreclosing mortgagee is concerned, the pur-
chaser may feel secure. Under the new sections if the defect in the
original proceedings was occasioned in good faith, reforeclosure will
be granted. This remedy is efficient and in some cases strict fore-
closure will be available against a fee owner.
Adverse interests, apparently senior to the purchaser's rights,
may now be tested and a speedy determination made. On the whole,
the new sections seem to provide the purchaser with a readily avail-
able, efficient method for him to eliminate summary defects to his
title, and to test the validity of the more important adverse interests.
Suppose, however, that in testing the validity of a more serious
adverse interest the court discovers in that party an outstanding equity
of redemption. Suppose further that the adverse party exercises re-
demption. Suppose the purchaser had paid at the sale a considerable
surplus over the mortgage debt and, further, that the value of the
property in question had doubled since the time of the foreclosure
Sale. In such a case, a determination of rights under the new statute
would do the purchaser little good. In short, the new statute does
nothing to remedy a situation where an exercisable outstanding equity
of redemption may cause a purchaser serious loss.
Another problem still facing the prospective purchaser is that
of undiscovered senior fee owners. The claims of such persons
might well be determined to be valid. As an example, assume that
the original mortgagor was not the sole owner of the property but
had merely a tenancy in common with another. 4  If that other per-
son's title was recorded but missed by all subsequent parties (improb-
able but possible), the purchaser would have serious difficulty settling
with him should the adverse claimant press his claim before the
fifteen-year statute had run.
Suppose also that the original terms of the foreclosure sale were
improperly drawn and a dower interest or a senior lien was omitted.65
The purchaser's recourse upon the court or referee or foreclosing
mortgagee is at least doubtful. 66
64 WA IsH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 314.
65 Cf. People v. Hazen, 132 Misc. 639, 230 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
Purchaser at foreclosure sale takes subject to rights of tax deed holder who
was not a party to the foreclosure action.66 Elmont Cemetery, Inc. v. Northprince Boulevard Holding Co., 266 App.
Div. 785, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (2d Dep't 1943). Herein, a purchaser discovered
1951]
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It may be answered that a mortgagor who suffered senior encum-
brances or co-interests in his fee should not be aided by efforts to
attain for him surplus monies. From the standpoint of encouraging
purchasers in an attempt to aid mortgagors in general, this argument
fails. It is still, however, a very strong argument that a reasonable
search of title would probably reveal these last mentioned defects.
As noted previously, however, situations will occur wherein a pur-
chase will be made subject to such defects.
Conclusions
It is the policy of New York law and that of most jurisdictions
today to encourage bidding at judicial foreclosure sale in an effort
to recover for the defaulted mortgagor a reasonable amount in sur-
plus monies. The new amendments, Sections 500-a, 506-a and 506-b,
have provided valuable remedies which are readily available toward
the clearing of defects in the title to property bought at foreclosure
sale. Since the prospect of poor title has had a discouraging influence
on prospective purchasers, the new sections should provide added in-
ducement to them. There remain, however, a few dissuasive aspects
of the problem still facing the purchaser; one of them is the possi-
bility of an unanticipated redemption resulting in a loss equal to the
amount of surplus bid. A purchase at foreclosure sale today is a
speculative investment. Speculators pay speculative prices and that
means little or no surplus monies.
On the other hand, we cannot offer to sell to the prospective
purchaser any more rights than were owned by the mortgagor in
default,67 since if we do so we must infringe upon the rights of
parties not in default. The trouble lies in the fact that the rights
of a party in default are not a readily salable item.
It may be argued, also, that it is senseless to dispute any par-
ticular phase of New York foreclosure procedure on the policy level,
since the entire procedure is outmoded. The fact remains, however,
that we have been using the existing procedure for over a century
with very little change and very little prospect of change. 68 It would
seem sensible that we strive, as has been done by the framers of the
subject statute, to aid in carrying out existing policy with the best
means available. While it is true that today mortgage defalcation is
not as common as it was two decades ago, it is also true that because
of a current inflationary economy, the average mortgagor in default
today has a greater equity in his property, part of which our laws
should attempt to regain for him in surplus monies.
a number of years after the sale that a tax item had not been satisfied. The
terms of sale stated that the purchaser was to report to the referee any taxes
to be satisfied. Held, not having done so in a timely manner no recourse is
now available.
67 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENcEs 38 (Rev. ed.
1940).
68 Sutherland, supra note 8, passim.
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